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Abstract  
This study examines the determinants of farmers’ participation in farm credit market in 
Tanzania. Both neoclassical economics and new institutional economics perspectives were 
applied in the current study to analyze determinants of demand for- and repayment of farm credit 
for Tanzania respectively. Data were collected from a survey of 75 agrocredit contracts in 
Western Tanzania. The demand analysis of farm credit has shown that demand for farm credit is 
determined by incentive and capacity to acquire the credit. It is argued that in economies with 
market coordination failures the demand for farm credit can only be justified if farmers are 
capable and willing to repay the credit they acquired in the past. It was also found out that the 
agrocredit repayment rate by borrower farmers in the study area increased with increase in 
implied cost of forms of coercion used to enforce repayment, quality of borrower farmer’s 
characteristics, utility cost of borrower’s degree of guiltiness or shame, value of multilateral 
relationships with market actors and value/volume of borrowed agrocredit. The paper concludes 
that under market coordination failures, the investment in social network and personalised 
relationships is inevitable in promoting supply and hence effective demand for farm credit 
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In rural Sub-Saharan Africa the decline in supply from government agencies following structural 
adjustment reforms, has not been adequately compensated for by an increase in private supply, a 
situation exacerbated by the growing underlying demand for credit as farmers intensify 
production to respond to new market opportunities, as well as land scarcity and soil exhaustion. 
Even where the services are extended to rural clients, small agricultural producers are only rarely 
able to access (Dorward et al 1998). The eliminatio by the government of credit, inputs and 
output subsidies and the privatization of agricultural marketing organizations (which has de-
linked credit, input and output markets) have led to high market coordination failures. Market 
coordination failure is narrowly defined here as the situation where one or some of the 
complementary markets or activities are missing in an economy thereby affecting performance of 
other markets. In this case credit, inputs and output markets are complementary to each other 
thus absence of one affects the other. Thus credit suppliers incur transaction costs to overcome 
transaction risks characterised by the absence of efficient complementary markets especially in 
poor rural areas. This poses a major policy challenge to developing financial institutions that are 
effective in targeting low-income small farm households while at the same time pursuing 
commercial viability. To some extent, structural adjustment programmes have been successful in 
generating a more favourable macroeconomic environment in some developing countries. 
However, ongoing market reforms and privatisation have not yet produced appreciable 
improvements in the provision of agricultural support services, nor have they increased farm 
profitability. Ngaruko (2008) argues that if anything, small farmers often have less access to 
rural banking and to other institutional agricultural lending facilities than before. 
 
The banking sector progress in Tanzania has been rel vant only to the mainstream banking 
system and its urban clients. The latter make up less than 10% of the Tanzanian population. For 
the low-income population concentrated in the rural a eas, it is obvious that the closure of rural 
branches of the country’s largest and state-owned commercial bank, the Cooperative and Rural 
Development Bank (CRDB); privatisation of the National Bank of Commerce (NBC); and the 
discontinuation of the Central Bank’s directed agricultural credit have had an adverse impact on 
the delivery of financial services to the rural areas. As a consequence, the principal providers of 
financial services to the rural poor have been the Savings and Credit Co-operative Societies 
(SACCOS), foreign donor-assisted Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and informal 
financial institutions (e.g. moneylenders, relatives, interlinked/interlocking contracts etc).   
 
Various types of interlinked credit arrangements such as nucleus estate outgrower schemes, 
sharecropping and contract farming have emerged as significant mechanisms to finance seasonal 
farm production. Interlinking of supply of agricultral inputs with credit and output marketing 
works well in a single-channel marketing system. It also works for tradable agricultural 
commodities as well as those which require highly specialised marketing, storage and processing 
facilities. Where alternative marketing outlets exist loan repayment may not be guaranteed 
because borrowers can opt to sell crops to other buyers (Dorward et al, 1998; Klein et al 1999). 
 
There is growing evidence (See for example Poulton, 1998 and Mwakaje, 1999) that some 
categories of smallholder cash crop farmers in Tanzania are now relying on semi formal and 




informal arrangements for financing seasonal farm production. Poulton observed that some 
cashew producers in Mtwara Region obtained seasonal credit from private traders through a 
transaction that is interlocked with input (sulphur) o  with blowing services.  Dorward et al, 
(1998) distinguish interlinked from interlocking contracts in that the former extends beyond 
seasonal input-output market contracts whereas the latt r is confined only to input-output 
contracts. Unlike in interlinked contracts, interlocking does not carry the restriction that prices in 
the different markets be jointly determined. They argue that interlocking seeks to enforce 
repayment of a pre-harvest loan through tying its recovery to activities in the output market. 
Mwakaje (1999) on the other hand explores the relativ  efficiency of various interlinked 
contractual arrangements between private traders and smallholder coffee farmers in Rungwe 
district. She observed an impressive performance for interlinked contractual arrangements 
between private traders and primary co-operative societies. 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
The emergence and evolution of semi formal and informal institutional arrangements in Tanzania 
has occurred outside the banking regulatory framework. Without a banking licence, deposits 
usually cannot be mobilised, debt instruments cannot be used and capital markets remain 
inaccessible. It is thus obvious that the range of funding sources for semi formal and informal 
financial intermediaries is narrower than that of frmal financial institutions (Giehler, 1999). 
Connected to this weakness, Gallardo et al, (2003) point out that there is no readily available 
organized information on the operations of the emerging credit suppliers such as private traders 
providing microfinance services in Tanzania particularly in rural areas. Kydd et al (2001) in their 
work on the international perspective on rural and farmer finance, point out that there seems to 
exist a knowledge gap about transaction arrangements adapted to supplying financial services to 
meet seasonal demand in rural areas following the defunct state initiatives. 
 
The reasons commonly put forward in the literature for the inability (lack of willingness) by 
formal private financial institutions to get involved in rural finance are varied, and sometimes 
contradictory. In general most studies associate the low effective supply of financial services to 
low private profits due to risks that are unique in rural areas and in agriculture (Kydd et al 2001, 
Dorward and Kydd, 2002; Elhiraika et al, 1998; Shreiner, 1997). Contrary to this, there is 
evidence of some successful stories illustrating the possibility for private financial organisations 
to make profits by engaging in rural and agriculture financing (See for example Temu, 1999; 
Yaron et al, 1998). However, Giehler (1999) argues that most of the widely discussed 
microfinance success stories and technologies do not address the specific constraints of lending 
to smallholder agriculture. This suggests that there are unexplored core reasons beyond risks 
involved in financing agriculture that may be responsible for the supply lags of formal financial 
institutions in the farm credit market.  Thus the objectives of this paper are two fold: first, to 
apply explain determinants of farm credit in rural Tanzania; and second, to determine core 









2.0 Conceptualising demand for farm input credit by smallholder farmers  
2.1 Neoclassical Economics perspective 
The neoclassical economic theory presumes that the in ersection between demand and supply 
functions of farm input credit determines the profit maximising level of the input credit. As noted 
previously, the demand function for farm input credit is referred to as a derived demand because 
it is determined to the larger extent, by the final demand for crops to be produced. Apart from the 
input credit borrowing interest rate, the demand for farm input credit depends on the price of the 
crop(s), prices of other inputs that substitute for or complement the input that is demanded and 
also the technical transformation of the input(s) into output (i.e. production function parameters). 
Thus economists would argue that a profit maximising decision process will shape the demand 
curve. Figure 8.1 shows a hypothetical example of a production process with a single input 
credit.  A farmer will maximise profit at the point where the value of marginal product (VMP) 
equals the marginal factor cost (MFC)29 as illustrated in Figure 8.1. When the MFC declines (all 
else equal) the profit maximising quantity of input credit demanded increases. If certain key 
factors such as output price or agronomic technologies change to make the input credit more 













Figure 1: Demand for input credit to the crop production process 
 
The rightward shift in demand curve increases the lev l of demand at any level of MFC. The 
concept of profit maximisation remains a theoretical oncept that seldom matches with real 
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smallholder decision making process. Kelly (2005) outlines four assumptions that underlie   the 
functionality of profit maximisation concept i.e.  
(i) the farmer seeks to maximise profit from the input credit use 
(ii)  the farmer knows the physical response curve 
(iii)the farmer is able to estimate output prices for the next marketing season and 
(iv) the farmer faces no risks or constraints related to access to credit sources and input 
purchases, production or output marketing 
 
Therefore, it is unlikely that farmers make profit maximising input credit demand decisions 
because none of the above assumptions are realistic particularly in Sub Sahara Africa. In 
addition, most farmers in poor countries face serious economic constraints such as high price risk 
and low income which limit their effective demand for farm input credit. Many smallholder 
farmers have difficulties in adopting recommended technical crop management practices because 
of low education. There are also institutional problems that limit the development of human 
capital and performance of the input credit and output markets. In diagnosing causes of weak 
effective demand for fertiliser for example, Kelly (op.cit) suggests that it is important to use 
analytical framework that goes beyond the simple arithmetic of profit maximisation.  
 
2.2  Modelling determinants of demand for farm credit  
 
The demand for farm input credit (Q (D)) which is measured as the value of input credit acquired 
can be viewed as the function of two broad factors: incentives to borrow (I) and capacity to 
access and use the input (C). Put in mathematical form this statement can be expressed as 
follows (holding other factors constant) 
 
),()( CIfDQ =           (1) 
 
Incentives include factors that directly influence th profitability of the input credit such as input 
credit yield potential (Y), price for the input credit (Pi) and output price (Py). The capacity to 
acquire and use the input credit depends on human and financial capital. Human capital can be 
measured in terms of farm labour availability (L), educational and skills level (S) and experience 
in borrowing (E) whereas financial capital can be expr ssed in terms of farmer’s wealth (W) 
indicated by value of food stocks, livestock and farm assets/equipment and access to credit 
sources (A) measured in terms of number of available sources of credit from which a farmer is 
eligible and willing to borrow. Therefore equation 1 can be rewritten as:  
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Where 80−α  are randomly assigned parameters that vary from one farmer to another. For 
econometrical specification purposes, a natural logarithmic transformation functional form is 
applied on Equation 2 to give a log-linear demand equation of the form represented on Equation 
3 
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Where 0,,,;0,,,;0 876254310 <>≥ ααααααααα                                                 
The expected signs of elasticities indicated in equation 3 are postulated from hypotheses that are 
linked to Figure 1. For example, the overall improvement in capacity to access and use input 
credit by farmers as well as improvement in human cpital are likely to shift the demand curve 
outwards by positively inspiring farmers’ perceptions of the economic potential of investing in 
agriculture hence increased effective demand for input credit. Improvements in financial capital 
on the other hand will shift the demand curve leftwards where farmers tend to demand less input 
credit but maintaining same net crop sales. This is o especially where farmers can avoid 
creditors’ stringent contract enforcement mechanisms by purchasing farm inputs using own 
sources. Decrease in cost of borrowing (interest plus transaction costs) will move a farmer along 
the same demand curve to a higher quantity of input credit. However, it should be noted that both 
incentives and capacity are affected by broader factors such as technologies and general 
institutional environment as well as the local degree of market coordination.  
 
2.3 Determinants of farm credit repayment by farmers: A New Institutional Economics 
perspective 
 
2.3.1 Credit Market Participation Model  
For a credit transaction contract to occur, and hence market participation, parties must believe 
that a given set of mutual obligations governing the transaction is respected. Fafchamps (2004) 
summarises the various mechanisms economic agents are to comply with transaction contracts 
into categories such as guilt or shame, legitimate or illegitimate coercion, threat of bilateral 
retaliation, and retaliation inflicted by third party group of people that are not part of the contract. 
Guilt and shame are internal emotions that may be harnessed to enforce the individual’s 
behaviour. Whereas one feels guilt for an action even if no one knows about it, shame on the 
other hand comes from disapproval from others. Fafchamps (2004) argues that although guilt and 
shame are not tractable in economic modelling, they can be powerful motivations for human 
behaviour particularly in rural areas where social interaction is highly integrated. The legitimate 
coercion involves the legal enforcement of contract through courts, which ultimately relies on the 
state’s monopoly over legitimate force. Illegitimate force can be used to enforce contractual 
obligations in which parties may resort to insults and violence directly, hire thugs, or bribe 
policemen to intervene. Fafchamps points out that whether legitimate or illegitimate, use of 
coercion to enforce contracts is costly.   
 
A threat of retaliation is another mechanism that induces compliance with contractual 
obligations. For such a mechanism to work, parties mu t interact with each other repeatedly over 
time. Retaliation can be in form of refusal to further transaction (bilateral punishment strategy) 




or inflicted by a group of people not part to the contract (multilateral punishment strategy). For 
the bilateral punishment strategy to be effective in deterring breach of contract the relationship 
between parties must be worth preserving. A group pnishment requires a co-ordination 
mechanism and circulation of information about contract compliance within the group.  
 
Let us apply Fafchamps market model and consider a fa m credit market contract that involves 
two prime parties: a farmer and a credit supplier. The farmer agrees to repay f amount of money 
(cash or in kind) at a future time period, t1 to the credit supplier in exchange for k amount of 
money (cash or in kind) at present time t0. Let us further assume that parties must value f and k 
differently so that gains from the exchange to occur i.e. the farmer likes to receive k more than 
paying f and vice versa for a credit supplier. Adapting Fafchamps model, two scenarios for a 
farmer and credit supplier to effectively participate in the market are conceptualised respectively 
in the subsequent sections. 
 
2.3.2 Farmer’s Compliance to Contract Model 
At time 1t a farmer may decide whether or not to comply with the contract i.e. repayment off . 
The cost of complying with the contract varies with farmer’s characteristics e and unanticipated 
shocksw . A farmer with other sources of income such as wage from non-farm employment will 
find it easier to repay the loan than a subsistence farm-based low income farmer during the 
drought period. Thus the cost of the farmer of repaying f amount can be presented as ),,( wefπ . 
In case of breach of contract, the farmer will receive a payoff of 0 but is subjected to incur some 
forms of punishment previously discussed.  A rational farmer fulfils the contract if the cost of 
complying is smaller than all penalties combined. This statement can be presented in equation 
form as: 
 
 ),(),(),,(),(),,( weRweVcwePweGwef +++≤π       (4) 
 
Where: 
(i) G(e,w) is the utility cost to the farmer due to guilt or shame 
(ii)  P(e,w,c) is the cost to the farmer due to various forms of coercive  action e.g. 
harassment, threat, court action etc. These forms of coercive actions are 
determined by the form of contract/governance structu e 
(iii)  V (e,w) is the value of the relationship i.e. the expected discounted value of future 
transactions with the credit supplier 
(iv) R (e,w) is the value of the lost reputation i.e. the expected discounted value of 
future transactions with all those who will refuse to transact with the farmer after 
a breach has occurred. 
If ∞=),,( wefπ , the borrower farmer will be unable to comply with the contract and the farmer 
will unlikely accept k value  credit, if any, only a smaller amount of k is sought.  Equation 4 
assumes that a borrower farmer makes decisions ex post on whether to comply with the terms 
and conditions of the farm credit. Alternatively a farmer may consider ex ante whether or not to 
accept the terms and conditions of the farm credit. Based on this assumption, a rational borrower 
will borrow farm credit if and only if he or she expects to derive some benefit from the contract 
given his or her characteristics, say *e . Then the value of receiving k for the borrower is denoted 




as *),( ekπ . In period 1t , the borrower farmer either repays and incurs a cost  of )*,,( wekπ , or 
does not pay and incurs the punishments listed in equation 4. Thus given farmers characteristics 
*e , repayment occurs with probability *)/,(''* eweFf
w
e ∂ .  The farmer therefore agrees to the 










  (5) 
where, the first term of the equation is the borrower farmer’s gain by complying with the loan i.e. 
repaying f value of principle loan amount plus interest and other charges in future by accepting k 
value of credit now. The second term refers to the expected cost of complying when compliance 
occurs (repayment is done) and the third term which is identical to equation 4 represents the 
expected cost of punishment when compliance does not occur (loan defaulting).  
 
From equation 5 it can be observed that if the enforcement is zero i.e. e=w’’ , the credit supplier 
expects no payments at all, and no contract is concluded. Similarly, if enforcement is very harsh 
and even the most trustful borrowers are occasionally unable to comply, the expected cost of 
punishment is larger than the gains from engaging in the contract. As a result, the borrower either 
does not borrow at all or reduces the risk of default by borrowing smaller amount of k. 
Fafchamps argues that for a transaction to occur enfo cement must be sufficiently strong to deter 
opportunistic breaches but not so strong to scare away ll potential borrowers.  
 
2.3.3 Credit Suppliers Compliance to Contract Model 
Consider that at time 0t  a credit supplier is asked to supply k  amount (cash or in kind) in 
exchange for a future promise of f amount (cash or kind). Let )(kΠ  and )( fΠ  be the value of 
k  and f to the credit supplier. The supplier will be willing to participate in the transaction if 
there are gains from the contract concerned i.e. if )()( fk Π>Π . In forming beliefs about the 
likelihood of receiving f , a rational supplier evaluates the chances of being paid i.e. the 
probability that equation 5 will be satisfied. To evaluate this probability, the supplier uses all the 
available information )(υ  at time 0t . Among others this information includes prior information 
about the distribution of potential characteristics of the borrower farmer, information gathered 
overtime through direct interaction with the farmer concerned, and the information conveyed by 
others about the borrower. Let )/,( υwef  be the joint cumulative distribution over  and w  
that captures the credit supplier’s beliefs given information υ. Assuming that it is easier for a 
farmer to repay in good states (i.e. without shocks) and that the farmer has more to lose in good 
states than in bad states, we can postulate *w as the level of shock wat which equation 5 is 
exactly satisfied and the borrower farmer with characteristics e is just indifferent between 
compliance (loan repayment) and breach (loan default) of contract. Thus equation 4 takes a form 
of equation 6: 
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Equation 6 shows that for any shockwabove *w  the farmer repays hence compliance to the 
contract. For any shock below *  no payment is made hence the farmer defaults. Thus a 
rational credit supplier agrees to a contract (offers a loan contract) if and only if amount he or she
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Where (e’, e’’) and (w’, w’’ ) are respectively the lowest and highest values that e and w can take. 
The double integral in equation 7 is necessary to take care of the fact that the probability of being 
repaid must be computed over all possible features of the borrower of which the supplier does 
not know. Equation 7 indicates that if the supplier had complete knowledge of the farmer’s 
characteristics, e, then the probability of supplier being repaid would be equal to the probability 
that the exogenous shockw , is greater than *w .  
 
The credit supplier may be able to affect the probability of repayment by affecting the 
contractual form, C. For instance mortgaging farmer’s real assets to service the debt or arranging 
for legal security, which tends to be costly. Assuming there are n possible forms (Cn) that a 
contract can take, each with own cost nB , the supplier must choose the contractual form, Cn so 
that [ ] nBkfE −Π−Π )(/)( υ  is maximised. Fafchamps (opt cit) argues that the solution to this 
optimisation problem can be to bypass formal guarantees if contract enforcement mechanisms 
other than ),,( CweP  are sufficient. If the transaction can be enforced through repeated 
interactions for example, namely through ),( weV  and ),( weR , one can expect the credit supplier 
to use little or no use at all of formal guarantees and of the court system. Small transactions are 
more difficult and costly to enforce through courts than large transactions, as result small farmer 
loan transactions are mainly self-liquidating, with mmediate loan repayment and no delayed 
obligations (Fafchamps, opt cit). 
 
3.0 Methodology 
Literature on methodologies of rural financial studies in developing countries shows two major 
distinctive approaches. The first is the Rural Financi l Market Approach (RFMA). This is 
principally based on the neoclassical economic assumptions of the perfect competitive market in 
which rural financial market linkages, roles and operations are holistically analysed. This 
approach has been a focus of rural credit analysis for many scholars in rural financial markets 
(e.g. Adams and Vogel, 1986 etc). The second alternive approach used to study rural financial 
market has been the Agricultural/Farm Finance Approach (FFA). This approach is based on the 
supply mechanism for financing agriculture. FFA leads to a conclusion that the prime role should 
be to promote lending institutions to channel credit to agriculture. The approach has an emphasis 
in individual entities in the market such as lenders, borrowers, traders, intermediaries etc and 




their interaction. The defunct state controlled farm credit initiatives followed the basics 
underlining this approach30.  
 
Compared with RFMA, FFA looks more appropriate for a developing country like Tanzania 
where competitive markets are yet to be realised (Kashuliza, 1994). However, the later is linked 
to market distortions by the state through market controls and subsidisation of state owned 
institutions. The current policy debate in rural financial market as also put forward by Dorward 
et al (1998) is to devise a policy that ascertains what the governments can do to enable private 
credit institutional innovations in forms and terms that conform to smallholder seasonal needs. 
Therefore due to its top down approach as well as the potential for state controls over the market, 
proponents of market reforms (neo-classical economists) see FFA as inappropriate approach. 
Therefore the RFMA would seem necessary at this time o assess an overall impact the liberal 
rural financial market has had so far in rural areas and in agriculture sector in particular. 
Nevertheless, as previously discussed, financial market reforms in Tanzania have not yet 
managed to yield expected competitive rural financil market. This implies that adoption of 
RFMA in studying rural financial markets in Tanzani may not as well be appropriate.   
 
Nonetheless, due to the importance of both approaches, and the specific objectives of this study, 
both approaches were adopted to some extent. Whereas, FFA was used to study farm level 
individuals and variables and their relationship to farm credit, the RFM was used to assess the 
reasons behind delays in establishing formal, competitive and sustainable rural financial market 
in Tanzania. Both FFA and RFMA follow the Neoclassical Economics (NCE) principle 
assumption of perfect credit market in which within g ven time and space, some form of uniform 
cost of borrowing (interest rate) across all economic agents is exogenously determined by market 
forces of supply of and demand for credit.    
 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory is the b st alternative and ideal approach for 
assessing the real functioning of the rural financil market particularly in Sub Saharan Africa 
(Dorward et al, 1998). From the NIE view, markets are perceived as rarely perfect, hence 
incorrect to adopt the Neoclassical Economics theory of competitive markets to analyse market 
behaviour. NIE approach incorporates both the RFMA and FFA. According to NIE, the economy 
works along the continuum between market hierarchies (formal, state regulated institutions) and 
competitive market. In the continuum is a set of various transaction cost minimising market 
contractual hybrids (informal and semi-formal institutions) which are in transition from hierarch 
of arrangements towards NCE’s perfect market.  It can be rightly stated from Williamson’s 
(1995) view on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) analysis that unless there is an alternative to 
such market arrangements, the prevailing contractual arr ngements are efficient because they 
bridge the unmet credit demand (for this case) by smallholder agriculture.  The current study 
applies NIE approach to assess the supply chain of the credit market for small-scale farmers’ 
seasonal credit demand. 
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3.1 Data collection and analysis methods 
As pointed above, the study followed the quali-quant mixed methods research approach where 
qualitative data were computed into quantitative data. This thus necessitated transforming 
qualitative data analysis into quantitative data anlysis. Major tools used to collect data were 
interviews (oral and semi structured questionnaire), documentation review and observation. The 
study followed the Dorward’s (2001) simplest pathway in primary data collection in which a 
researcher observes variables of interest in the field and immediately records the data.  Data were 
collected from 75 purposefully observed bilateral credit contractual arrangements between 
suppliers of credit and borrower farmers or credit intermediaries. The data collected from 
suppliers were geared towards quantifying transaction cost of lending/borrowing across each 
contractual arrangement as well as data on determinants of market entry.  
 
3.2 Choice and measurement of variables used in the study 
3.2.1 Repayment to Debt Ratio (RRATIO) 
RRATIO was the dependent variable in farm credit demand and compliance models. A borrower 
farmer will repay the loan if there is a net gain from repaying. The gain can be in form of 
monetary profit or non monetary gain like good social relationship with the credit supplier.  Thus 
different borrowers value the gain from the credit contract differently depending on the contract 
terms and conditions and also on the features of the institutional arrangement through which 
farmer received farm credit. RRATIO which is principally the repayment rate was computed as a 
ratio of the amount so far repaid to the total debt. Total loan was measured as a summation of 
principle, interest, fees and charges the farmer was supposed to pay at the end of the contract, 
and all costs incurred in the course of making repayments. The transaction costs included 
transport costs to and from repayment office for each instalment as well as opportunity cost of 
time spent in making payments. A farmer who had fully repaid had a ratio of 1 whereas a farmer 
who completely failed to repay has a value of 0. Figure 2 and table 1 indicate that  the repayment 
rate (RRATIO) was about 78% with about 40 out of 75 (53.3%) of farmers having fully repaid 
their loans.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of selected determinants of farm credit repayment 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
RRATIO 75 .00 1.00 58.28 .7770 .29866 
CCOMPLIANCE 75 .01 2.47 30.04 .4006 .49057 
VBIRELATE 75 .01 1.00 36.62 .4883 .36358 
FCHARACTER 75 -11.00 16.00 68.00 .9067 4.08085 
FSHOCKS 75 -18.00 14.00 25.00 .3333 8.16441 
CGUILTINESS 75 -8.00 22.00 194.00 2.5867 5.52658 
CCOERCION 75 -10.00 10.00 -6.00 -.0800 2.86998 
VMULTIREL 75 857.14 358666.67 3660667.5 48808.90 51357.24 
VCREDIT 75 1500.00 1920000.0 4725890.0 63011.86 225408.38 





 Figure 2: Farm Credit repaid to total debt ratio 
 
3.2.2  Cost of Compliance with credit repayment (CCOMPLIANCE) 
Cost of compliance with credit repayment was measured as ratio of total debt to total farm 
income. For the farmer to comply with loan repayment, total debt must not override total farm 
income from crops to which the farm credit was used. A ratio of 1 implies that a farmer breaks 
even by repaying (earns no profit) but does not face coercive costs implied in case of failure to 
repay. Controlling for other costs of production, a CCOMPLIANCE ratio above 1 implies that 
farm income alone is not sufficient to cover the total debt thus the cost of compliance with 
repayment is unbearably high. Therefore the higher t  CCOMPLIANCE ratio the lower the 
amount of farm credit debt repaid by borrower farmer. Farm credit with a CCOMPLIANCE ratio 
of 0 or near to zero will not receive any repayment from the borrower farmer unless the farmer 
finds coercive actions too costly to incur. Figure 3 shows that a larger proportion of farmers had 
a CCOMPLIANCE score of less than 0.5 with sample CCOMPLIANCE score of 0.4 but none 
had a zero score (Table 1).  Thus CCOMPLIANCE is negatively related to RRATIO. 
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Figure 3: Cost of compliance with farm credit repayment 
 
3.2.3 Quality of farmer’s characteristics (FCHARATER) 
The quality of the farmer’s characteristics is a variable that depicts farmer’s description of own 
attributes relevant to credit borrowing. This information is embedded in the farmer himself to 
which a credit supplier may not have an access. The assumption is that borrowers know what 
their strengths and weaknesses are when borrowing, hich could have an impact in their ability 
or willingness to repay.  
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Figure 4: Quality of farmer's characteristics 
 
A weighted score was obtained for each borrower. Using attitudinal scale some characteristics of 
importance to the farmer (e.g. multiple sources of income, experience in borrowing, ability to 
increase yield and sales, social capital, reputation fr m community etc) were arranged in 
ascending order of their importance each with a corresponding weight. The overall score for each 
respondent was computed as the summation of the weighted scores from all the important 
attributes. The higher the positive score the higher t  borrower quality and vice versa. Table 1 
shows that although the mean sample FCHARACTER score was small, it was positive implying 
that the qualities of the borrowers were important in their abilities to repay the due loans. Thus 
FCHARACTER is expected to significantly have a positive relationship with RRATIO hence 
compliance to credit contract.  
 
3.2.4 Unanticipated farm output shocks (FSHOCKS) 
Unanticipated shocks affecting farm performance such as bad weather, theft, pests and diseases, 
low commodity prices, low demand and other commodity market failures affect individual 
farmers differently. FSHOCKS variable was computed as a weighted score of all important 
attributes of unanticipated shocks that might have ff cted credit repayment potential of the 
borrower. Many honest smallholder borrower farmers xperiencing any form of farm income 
shocks would be willing but not able to repay the borrowed credit because their farms are not 
insured. Some lending institutional arrangements do lend to borrowers who have alternative 
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sources of income in addition to farm income with expectation that non farm income would 
supply loan repayment during the shock period.  
 
Figure 5: Unanticipated farm output shocks 
 
In general terms presence of shocks negatively affects xpected RRATIO and hence increased 
probability of failure to comply with the credit contract.     
 
3.2.5 Utility Cost of Guilt or Shame (CGUILTINESS) 
Although it is argued that shame and guilty are notamenable in economic modelling 
(Fafchamps, 2004), shame and guilt are however very important determinants of one’s reliable 
honesty to credit repayment. The major problem relies in assessing them. CGUILTINESS 
measures the cost implied in a borrower’s efforts to overcome likely guilt or shame from the 
community resulting from failure to repay. CGUILTINESS was measured as a score of most 
important attributes that best described the extent to which they influenced farmer’s behaviour to 
comply with the credit repayment to avoid feeling guilty or ashamed.  Examples of such 
attributes include respectable community leadership, commitment to religious beliefs, loyalty to 
the laws and regulations, reputation of the household, relationship with people with high public 
reputation (e.g. religious leaders), involvement in politics, highly respected member of the family 
by the public (e.g. one’s close relative) etc. Perception of these attributes was obtained from 
farmers using a 5 point attitudinal Likert scale. For each farmer, CGUILTINESS was computed 
as the summation of weighted sores from each attribu e in the Likert scale. The higher positive 
score indicates the extent to which it would be too c stly (in terms of felt guilt or shame) if one 
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failed to repay the loan and vice versa. Thus CGUILTINESS has a positive impact on RRATIO 
and consequently compliance to credit contract. 
 
Figure 6: Utility cost due to guilt or shame 
 
3.2.6 Cost due to Forms of Coercion (CCOERCION) 
Forms of credit repayments enforcement such as coercion which are adopted by many rural 
credit suppliers do impart some costs to borrower farmers. The costs range from monetary and 
physical injury to psychological depending on the form of coercion used. Whether formal (e.g. 
use of police or courts) or informal (e.g. physical attack by hired third party persons), any form 
of coercion has a cost implication to a borrower and indirectly as opportunity cost of overcoming 
the coercion threats (e.g. transport costs and opportunity costs of time spent on seeking for an 
excuse from the lender). If for instance, for any contract in which the probability of 
CCOERCION is beyond certain higher levels, potential borrower farmers will not be motivated 
to apply for that particular farm credit, however important the credit is to the farmer. 
CCOERCION was measured as a score transformed from a 5 point attitudinal scale where 
farmers were asked to rate the extent to which the avoidance of consequences of coercive actions 
likely to be adopted by the farm credit supplier in case of failure to repay. The higher the positive 
score the higher the cost of forms of coercion.  
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Figure 7: Cost of forms of coercion 
 
3.2.7 Lost Value of Bilateral Relationship (VBIRELATE) 
The lost value of relationship between credit supplier and a borrower farmer was measured as the 
farmer’s opportunity cost of the supplier’s terminat on of exchange dealings if the farmer 
defaulted. Thus VBIRELATE was computed as the ratio of the total volume of transaction from 
private supplier of the largest volume of the most important input credit to the farmer to farmer’s 
total operational (transformation) cost of the farming system to which the loan was (to be) 
committed during the given farming season.  
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Figure 8: Value of bilateral relationship 
 
A farmer with a higher ratio (close to 1) is likely to repay the loan as this implies a substantial 
financial deficit to finance production in the subsequent season should the bilateral relationship 
be terminated. This is expected to be so common in rural areas where credit market is more or 
less monopolistic. Table 1 shows that sample mean VBIRELATE was 0.49 ranging from 0.01 to 
1. Therefore we postulate that VBIRELATE is positively related to RRATIO. 
 
3.2.8 Loss of Value of Multilateral Relationship (VMULTIREL) 
A farmer who has lost reputation from a bilateral relationship with a credit supplier is likely to 
lose reputation from all relationships with trade partners in other market dealings in which the 
farmer participates.  This is common especially in rural areas where traders dealing with the 
same do share information about the farmer provided that their individual market share is not 
affected by the shared information. Where a farmer receives more than one service (e.g. input 
credit and output market), a failure to repay the loan could lead to a direct loss of reputation not 
only in input credit but also in output market dealings with the other trade partners. The 
opportunity cost of loss of value of multilateral relationship is the total gain from the foregone 
dealings which are reflected in total farm income.  
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Figure 9: Value of multilateral relationship 
 
To take into consideration the effect of farm size on total farm income, average total farm 
income was used as a proxy measure of VMULTIREL since a farmer would likely earn no farm 
income without any trade partners dealing with the farmer. The average farm income (value of 
crop sales per total farm size) which was measured in TShs per ha reflects the capability of the 
borrower’s farm to generate sufficient returns to cover loan repayments as well as farmers’ 
needs. However farmers can generate higher incomes if production and marketing environments 
are favourable. A farmer is largely dependent on credit from all market participants (productive 
input suppliers, crop buyers, labour suppliers etc)to realize higher incomes. Farmers with higher 
farm incomes are likely to repay their due loans after crop sales compared to those with low 
levels of farm returns. Thus the farmer has to keep all the market agents by fully complying with 
the farm credit terms otherwise he or she may face retaliation from the market actors which may 
lower farm incomes. Therefore it can be hypothesized that farm returns increases with access to 
all markets and vice versa, holding other factors (e.g. weather) stable across farms. Table 1 
indicates that the sample mean value for VMULTIREL was TShs 48,808.90; however the range 
between minimum and maximum VMULTIREL was very significant. VMULTIREL is expected 
to have a direct positive impact on RRATIO. 
 
3.2.8 Value of farm credit borrowed (VCREDIT) 
Demand for farm credit was measured in terms of the monetary value of total farm credit a 
farmer borrowed in the previous season. It is assumed that given farmers characteristics and 
external environment, the farmer will increase amount of farm credit if the implied cost of 
400000.00 200000.000.00














Std. Dev. =51357.2418 
N =75 
 




repaying the loan do not exceed the benefits and vice ersa. In addition, if the farmer views the 
threats of failure to repay being higher or socially unbearable, this may force the farmer to 
borrow smaller amount of the credit that he/she feels repayable. A farm credit with very flexible 
repayment conditions/cost is expected to trigger farmers to increase volume of credit. Heavy 
farm credit borrowers in the study area had higher rates of failure to timely repay the loans.  
 
 
Figure 10: Total farm credit borrowed 
 
It was also observed that the relatively well off farmers comprised of less than 15% of sample 
farmers were likely to fully comply with loan repayment and that these farmers had on average, 
acquired the least amount of farm credit. This presumes that repayment rate decreases with 
increase in volume of farm credit. Figure 10 and Table 1 show that the sample mean VCREDIT 
was TShs 63,011.89 and that most of the farmers on average had borrowed farm credit less than 
TSh. 200,000  although a very small proportion of brrowers obtained significant volume of 
farm credit of up to almost TShs. 2 million 
 
4.0 Results and Discussions 
Equation 3 was estimated based on survey data to model the demand function for farm credit in 
the study area. Table 2 summarises the definitions and descriptive statistics for selected variables 
in the analysis. A backward linear regression analysis was run to estimate equation 8.3 using 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimator.  
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Table 2: Variable definition and descriptive statistics for farm credit demand model 
Variable Definition/measurement Descriptive statistics/frequency 
  Mean Minimum Maximum 
FARM 
CREDIT(QD) 
Total amount of farm credit  (inkind 
+cash credit in TShs) 
63,011.87 1,500.00 1,920,000.00 
AVEREVENUE (Y) Ratio of total crop sales to total land 
under crop production (TShs/ha) 
48,808.90 857.14 358,666.67 
LAND (F) Total acreage of own suitable for 
farming/farm business (ha) 
6.27 0.75 30.0 
INTEREST(Pi) Average interest rate (average of 
summation of interest rates on 
inkind and cash farm credit) 
94.50 0.00 300.00 
LABOUR(ha) Number of hours spent by farmer on 
own farm out 10 hours working day 
6 1 10 
EDUCATION (S) =1 if farmer had post primary    
education 
= 0 if otherwise 
  1 = 55 
observations 
0 = 20 
observations 
EXPERIENCE (E) = 1 if farmer had acquired farm 
credit in the 80s, 90s and 2000s 
= 0 if otherwise 
  1 = 43 
observations 
0 = 32 
observations 
WEALTH (W) Total monetary assets of farm assets 
and livestock (TShs) 
399,621.47 6000.00 2,203, 2000.00 
ACCESS (A) Number of input credit source from 
which farmer has borrowed  

















Table 3: Correlation matrix for selected variables in the demand for farm credit model 
  Education Experience Wealth Access Interest Land Labour Farm Credit 
Education 1        
Experience -.150 1       
Wealth .085 .182 1      
Access -.170 -.280(*) -.014 1     
Interest  .122 .036 -.085 -.029 1    
Land  .021 .178 .055 -.198 -.172 1   
Labour  -.481(**) .439(**) .037 -.246(*) .044 -.148 1  
Farm Credit .159 -.153 .048 .011 -.211 .210 -.181 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The correlation coefficient matrix presented in table 3 shows no threat of multicolinearity 
problems because no pair of variables had significatly large Pearson coefficient to justify 
presence of serious collinearity problems31. It is however shown that access to many suppliers of 
farm credit and farmer’s borrowing experience are negatively linearly collated. The same 
relationship is seen between number of hours a farmer spends on farm business and education as 
well as access to suppliers of farm credit. Experience and labour are positively collated. 
However, as noted before the correlation coefficients are too small to pose a threat of colinearity 
problems. The absence of significant linear correlation coefficient conforms the assumptions 
made on the demand model (equation 2) in which the demand function was assumed to be non 
linear. 
 
Table 4 summarises the results of the regression analysis. In model 1 all the 8 explanatory 
variables were included in the analysis but only 5 explanatory variables were retained in the last 
regression step which is represented by model 4 in Table 5. The goodness of fit of the regression 
analysis was interpreted in terms of the significance of the ANOVA’s F test statistic and R2. In 
interpreting the regression output, both the unstandardised and standardised regression 
coefficients were considered. Whereas unstandardised regression coefficients express effects in 
terms of the natural units of the variables, standardised regression coefficient express effects in 
terms of standard deviation. In this study the Standardised coefficients are used to interpret the 
                                                          
31
 Several authors have offered guidelines for the intrpretation of correlation matrix coefficients. The current study adopted the 
interpretation suggested by Cohen (1988) who suggested the following interpretation for correlation in psychological research. 
Correlation Negative Positive 
Small -0.29 to -0.10 0.10 to 0.29 
Medium -0.49 to -0.30 0.30 to 0.49 
Large -1.00 to -0.50 0.50 to 1.00 
 




coefficients because it’s easier to immediately tell how strong an effect is i.e. how close to -1 or 
+1 without thinking about variable unit.  
 
Table 5 shows that Model 4 is the best farm credit demand model because the model has all the 
variable parameters statistically significant. Model 4 indicates that average farm revenue and 
land are statistically significant at 1% significane level, education at 5% and borrowing interest 
rate and wealth at 10%. The model has negative elasticities for education level and interest rate 
suggesting that demand for farm credit decreases with increase in level of borrower’s education 
and/or increase in borrowing interest rate. The negative impact of increase in borrowing interest 
rate on demand for farm credit somewhat conforms to the conventional demand theory as well as 
to the model hypothesis. The negative impact of level of education on demand for farm credit 
contradicts with the model hypothesis. The model suggests that the higher the education level the 
less the quantity of borrowed inputs will be demanded by the farmer. Although education is 
expected to be an important human capital that can trigger capability to outsource and use farm 
input credit, it seems to be the opposite for smallholder farmers in the study area. 
 
There are several reasons that can explain this scenario. One of the explanations is that many of 
these farmers as described in previous sections are p t time farmers with formal wage 
employment in the formal sector. Such farmers undertak  farming as business to diversify their 
income sources by purchasing inputs using own savings. The alternative explanation is linked to 
the risk averseness of more educated farmers since they are capable of computing marginal 
returns from farming business. With the diminishing marginal returns in smallholder agriculture, 
highly educated farmers will shirk away from borrowing inputs to intensify production but rather 
will undertake extensive farming system by employing cheap farm labour. Many of the farmers 
with post primary education were also involved in input credit supply business. They hold 
relatively large consignment of input such as fertiliser and supply it on credit to other farmers 
and use the remaining lot to their own farms. 
 
Thus these farmers will only apply fertilisers in their farms if they remain with surplus and they 
will rarely outsource such inputs. Another explanation for the negative impact of education level 
on demand for farm credit is the thinness of input market. The typology of smallholder farmers 
covered in chapter seven indicated that the educated f rmers comprising of about 18.7% of 
sample were relatively large farmers who would require larger quantities of inputs than the 
current suppliers could afford. As such they tended to forego borrowing inputs all together since 















Table 5: Estimated demand function for farm credit 
 






t-value Sig. R2 Adj R2 
  B Std. error Beta     
   
1 (Constant) 2.068 1.040   1.989 .051   
 EDUCATION -.293 .161 -.249 -1.825 .073   
 EXPERIENCE -.038 .270 -.072 -.142 .887   
 WEALTH .118 .115 .112 1.023 .310   
 ACCESS .207 1.265 .082 .164 .870 .658 .515 
 AVEREVENUE .425 .154 .332 2.764 .007   
 LABOUR .093 .323 .035 .288 .774   
 INTEREST -.358 .223 -.174 -1.605 .113   
 LAND .603 .217 .327 2.783 .007   
2 (Constant) 2.032 1.000   2.031 .046   
 EDUCATION -.292 .159 -.248 -1.834 .071   
 WEALTH .120 .113 .114 1.059 .294   
 ACCESS .031 .274 .012 .114 .909   
 AVEREVENUE .423 .152 .331 2.782 .007 .658 .511 
 LABOUR .092 .320 .035 .286 .776   
 INTEREST -.359 .221 -.174 -1.623 .109   
 LAND .604 .215 .328 2.810 .007   
3 (Constant) 2.051 .979   2.095 .040   
 EDUCATION -.294 .157 -.250 -1.871 .066   
 WEALTH .119 .112 .113 1.063 .292   
 AVEREVENUE .424 .151 .332 2.817 .006 .658 .508 
 LABOUR .089 .317 .034 .282 .779   
 INTEREST -.364 .217 -.176 -1.677 .098   
 LAND .600 .210 .325 2.856 .006   
4 (Constant) 2.111 .949   2.225 .029   
 EDUCATION -.271 .134 -.231 -2.019 .047   
 WEALTH .119 .112 .112 1.063 .092   
 AVEREVENUE .426 .149 .333 2.851 .006 .657 .504 
 INTEREST -.365 .215 -.177 -1.693 .095   
 LAND .588 .204 .319 2.877 .005   
 
Model 4 confirms earlier arguments by Kelly (2005) that demand for farm credit depends to a 
large extent on what happens to the crops during production as well as during the postharvest 
processes including crop marketing. This is envisaged in the significant positive impact of 
farmers’ wealth, average farm revenue and access to land. Wealthy farmers own near to liquid 
assets such as livestock which can be sold to generate income, part of which can be used to repay 
the due cash credit. It was found that goats had liquid demand in the study area hence in some 
instances were used as form of collateral accepted by many local suppliers of farm credit.  
 
The results of the model suggest that a one unit increase in either yield (average revenue) or land 
resource endowment increases demand for farm credit by one third. It was observed earlier that 
from mid 1990s to most recent more land was put under cotton and tobacco production in the 
study area due to improved commodity markets for these commodities. Output for these crops is 




highly dependent on the application of pesticides to control fungal diseases in cotton and 
nematodes in tobacco. Thus in the same period the demand by farmers for fungicides and 
nematocides had also increased. The construction by the state of the irrigation scheme for paddy 
production in Nyakayenzi village in the study area increased land to farmers who had little or 
had none at all. Since output of paddy production is to a greater extent determined by use of 
improved seeds and application of pesticides, this increased demand for these inputs which were 
supplied on credit under varying forms of contractul arrangements (credit contractual 
arrangements are covered in chapters nine and ten). The next section explains the farmers’ 
compliance to credit repayment which is an essential part of the credit contract. 
 
4. 2 Determinants of farmers’ compliance to farm credit repayment 
A multivariate regression model was estimated with the rate of repayment measured as the ratio 
of loan repaid to total debt (RRATIO) as the dependent variable. The backward regression 
analysis was used to estimate significance of 10 explanatory variables. At each stage, a variable 
with the least correlation with the dependent variable was excluded resulting to 10 different 
models. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used to observe the multicolinearity between 
associations of pairs of variables. The correlation analysis helps to identify pairs of explanatory 
variables with very high correlation coefficient whic  if both are included in the regression 
analysis might result to autocorrelation or multicolinearity problems. Table 6 shows that all pairs 
of variables had small to medium Pearson’s correlation coefficients. Although some variables 
had significant correlation, none of the variable pairs had large coefficients i.e. coefficients ≥ ± 
0.5 which could signal the presence of multicolinearity problem. 
 
Table 7 represents output of models 1 and 10 only whereas table 8 shows all the variables 
excluded in the last stage (model 10). It can be observed that model 10 contains explanatory 
variables which are significant at p≤0.05. The model explains about 46.1 percent of the variation 
in rate of repayment. The significant F value indicates that this is a significant amount of 
explained variables.  
 




CCOMPLIANCE VBIRELATE FCHARACTER FSHOCKS CGUILTINESS CCCOERCION VMULTIREL VCREDIT 
RRATIO 1         
CCOMPLIANCE .048 1        
VBIRELATE -.135 -.177 1       
FCHARACTER .148 .040 .030 1      
FSHOCKS .026 -.011 -.188 .027 1     
CGUILTINESS -.196 .076 -.159 -.185 -.108 1    
CCCOERCION .062 .252* -.083 .130 .127 -.185 1   
VMULTIREL   .256* -.118 -.156 .140 -.215 -.048 -.025 1  
VCREDIT -.083 .488** -.100 .155 -.102 .042 .359** .034 1 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 




Results in model 10 in table 7 indicate that the cofficients of cost due to forms of coercion 
(CCOERCION), quality of farmer’s characteristics (FCHARACTER), utility cost due to shame 
or guilty (CGUILTINESS), value of multilateral relationship (VMULTIREL) and value of farm 
credit (VCREDIT) were significant at ≤0.05. Except for VCREDIT whose parameter estimate 
had unprecedented sign, the parameters for CCOERCION, FCHARACTER, CGUILTINESS and 
VMULTIREL conformed to the expected signs. The cost f compliance with farm credit 
repayment (CCOMPLIANCE), value of bilateral relationship (VBIRELATE) and unanticipated 
farm output shocks (FSHOCKS) were excluded in model 10 because they exhibited very low 
partial correlation with the repayment rate hence th ir parameter estimates were statistically 
insignificant. Though statistically insignificant the parameter estimate for CCOMPLIANCE had 
expected sign whereas parameter estimates for VBIRELAT  and FSHOCKS had signs contrary 
to set hypotheses. 
 









































CCOMPLIANCE -.036 .080 -.059 -.449 .655 
VBIRELATE -.072 .102 -.087 -.707 .482 
FCHARACTER .019 .009 .263 2.184 .033 
FSHOCKS .001 .004 .018 .149 .882 
CGUILTINESS .015 .007 .279 2.198 .032 
CCOERCION .014 .013 .101 .821 .415 
VMULTIREL 1.35E-006 .000 .232 1.716 .091 
VCREDIT 
 












.009 .064 .194 2.104 .027 
FCHARACTER 
 
.017 .008 .229 2.033 .046 
CGUILTINESS .012 .006 .225 2.023 .047 
VMULTIREL 
 
1.61E-006 .000 .277 2.507 .004 
 VCREDIT 
 
7.88E-008 .095 .138 2.088 .031  
a Dependent Variable: repayment to total debt ratio 









Table 8: Excluded variablesk from model 10 by backward regression 
Model   Beta In t Sig. Partial 
Correlation 
Collinearity Statistics 
            Tolerance 
10 FSHOCKS .071(j) .629 .531 .075 .938 
  CCOMPLIANCE -.091(j) -.818 .416 -.097 .981 
  VBIRELATE -.127(j) -1.134 .261 -.134 .948 
j  Predictors in the Model: (Constant), cost due to forms of coercion, quality of farmer's characteristics, 
utility cost due to guilt or shame, value of multila eral relationship, value of farm credit borrowed 
k  Dependent Variable: repayment to total debt ratio 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
It is thus convincing to assume that farmers are not o ly motivated by the factors shown in table 
5 (model 4) to demand for farm credit, but also have to be able to complete the transaction by 
repayment of the loans when due. Acquiring the farm c edit alone is not a guarantee that a farmer 
will be able to repay the loans and be able to repeat borrowing in the following season. In a 
similar study Ngaruko (2008) pointed out that in geeral terms there was tendency for decreasing 
number of farmers going for repeat-borrowing whereby the number was higher in the first 
borrowing than in the subsequent seasons from same source of credit/principle supplier. This 
suggests that high demand for farm credit is realisd in the first time borrowing than in the 
subsequent seasons hence demand for credit decreases with farmer’s repeat (experience in) 
borrowing.  
 
The demand analysis of farm credit has shown that demand for farm credit is determined by 
incentive and capacity to acquire the credit. The major incentive factors were expected increase 
in average farm income, low cost of borrowing and access to land. The major factors of capacity 
to borrow were resource endowment (wealth) and education. However the analysis indicated that 
education had a negative impact on demand for farm credit. This is so mainly because most of 
educated farmers were wage employees in no farm sub sector hence they tended to use their own 
income to purchase inputs.  Farm labour and experience in borrowing were not found significant 
factors determining demand for farm credit. The findings on farm credit repayment factors 
conforms to the hypothesis that under conditions of market coordination failures and thinness of 
markets, the compliance to farm credit transaction c tracts is mainly based on nature of the 
human relationship between transacting parties rathe  than the cost of borrowing (interest rate).  
 
The results of this study suggest that the agrocredit payment rate by borrower farmers in the 
study area increased with increase in implied cost of forms of coercion used to enforce 
repayment, quality of borrower farmer’s characterisics, utility cost of borrower’s degree of 
guiltiness or shame, value of multilateral relationships with market actors and value/volume of 




borrowed agrocredit. As noted before the parameter stimate for the volume of borrowed 
agrocredit had a positive sign contrary to the hypothesis. This implies that the increase in 
quantity of agroinput credit is associated with increased performance of the crop to which the 
credit is used, which in turn enables the farmer to epay the loan. Thus smaller quantities of 
agroinput credit were not sufficient enough to yield surplus farm income to repay the loans hence 
low repayment rate for small borrowers.  
 
Given the fact that the explanatory power of the model was not very high and that the current 
study was conducted with a small number of observations from a single district and for a shorter 
period of time, it could be premature to generalize th se findings. Wider coverage of similar 
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